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1. Europe and the Balkans at a cross-roads
Crises sometimes happen to be turning points in history, serving as eye-
openers that stimulate a fundamental reversal of behaviour. The Chinese
language has created a symbol uniquely reflecting this reality: the ideo-
gram for ‘crisis’ is composed of two characters which separately mean
‘danger’ and ‘opportunity’.
In retrospect, historians might view the date of 10 June 1999 as such a
turning point in history, embodying both tragedy and hope. It was on this
very day that the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution No.
1244, which finally put an end to the war in Kosovo; and on the same day
a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Cologne, assembling representatives
from 38 countries and 15 international organisations, formally endorsed
the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, thus marking the start of a
new phase in international Balkan politics.
President Gligorov of Macedonia grasped this janus-headed reality quite
well when he appealed to his fellow Heads of State and Government a few
weeks later in Sarajevo: ”This crisis gave us a chance. It is up to us toRafael Biermann
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take advantage of it, to be brave and determined enough and to turn this
chance into a success.”
1
Certainly, at the threshold of a new millennium, Europe has reached a
cross-roads. Decisions taken by this generation will determine whether all
the peoples of Europe are able to start the new century with an unprece-
dented period of stability, peace and welfare, or whether this generation
will simply experience a painful déjà vu of European history, starting the
next century as the last one ended - with a crisis, the tremors of which
shook Europe all the way from the Atlantic to the Ural.
The last ten years of post Cold War history have been marked by a par-
allelism of two completely diverging trends in Europe: the arduous and at
the same time exciting process of transforming the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe that were cut off for decades from the political, eco-
nomic, and cultural life in Europe, followed by a successive opening of
the Euro-Atlantic institutions, thus creating a pan-European peace order
that bodes well for the future of this continent. However, exactly the
same time-span was pre-dominated in another part of Europe, the Western
Balkans, by what no-one in post Cold War Europe could imagine again:
four incredibly awful wars in only eight years, which destabilised a whole
region, driven by chauvinist nationalism and a cruelty deemed impossible
in post war Europe.
2
1 Address of His Excellency Kiro Gligorov at the Sarajevo Summit for the Stability
Pact for South Eastern Europe on July 29, 1999 (personal copy of the author).
2 German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer at the Petersberg Conference on 27 May
1999: “Ten years after the end of the Cold War Europe has once again two faces.
On the one hand we have the success story of European integration, the Europe of
human rights and of equality, of peace, democracy and welfare. However, at the
same time the Europe of nationalism, of the past, of tyranny and brutal suppression
of human rights that we already deemed to have overcome has been revived, in
Vukovar, in Srebrenica, in Racak and in the many nameless places of horror” (this
and the following translations done by the author), Bulletin des Presse- und Infor-
mationsamtes der Bundesregierung, No. 34, 31 May 1999, p. 359.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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It is one of the most painful and frustrating realities European leaders
have to face today that the many attempts to pacify this trouble-spot of
Europe have not succeeded. This century has not only ended with four
Balkan wars; it also started with three wars in that region, with apparently
just a period of respite in between: the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 and
the war between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Serbia, which dragged
the whole of Europe into turmoil and conflict in 1914. It was in those
years that the image of the Balkans as the ‘powder-keg’ and ‘backyard’ of
Europe became firmly established in the minds of the contemporaries,
equating the term ‘balkanisation’ with crisis and trouble in “far-away
countries” of which “we know nothing”, as Chamberlain admitted in
1938.
Due to the war in Kosovo, which finally brought international attention
back to this part of Europe, today the international community has -- late
but hopefully not too late -- announced a fundamental policy shift in its
approach to the region, eventually learning the overdue lessons of history.
The simple truth is that Europe cannot afford another devastating conflict
as in Bosnia and Kosovo, neither in the Balkans nor elsewhere. The inter-
national community has been simply compelled to re-assess its approach
towards Serbia and the region as a whole. In Kosovo, its credibility, its
capacity to act and its resources were challenged to the utmost limits: the
appalling mockery of those values most precious for the Euro-Atlantic
community by a regime practising clandestine ethnic cleansing as a delib-
erate political strategy in the outgoing 20th century; the destabilisation of
an entire region with incalculable consequences for the whole of Europe;
the enormous costs to contain and stop a war machine like the one of
Miloševi￿ ; the enormous logistical and financial challenge to supply al-
most one million refugees and displaced persons with food and shelter;
the ensuing burdens of peace-keeping and post war reconstruction that
will last for many years. The international community will hardly be able
to manage another crisis of this proportion in the coming years. Finally,Rafael Biermann
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the Euro-Atlantic community had to realise and to accept that Europe as a
whole has a stake in the Balkans.
2. The basic rationale of the Stability Pact
As a consequence, two lessons have begun to dominate the minds of many
in the Western capitals; lessons that have become the basic rationale for
the Stability Pact. At the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Cologne on 10
June 1999 Joschka Fischer declared:
“The previous policy of the international community vis-a-vis former
Yugoslavia had two severe deficits: It concentrated on the conse-
quences instead of on the sources of conflict, and it tackled the prob-
lems of the region individually and separately from the ones in other
parts of Europe.”
3
Fischer expressed what has become common sense among European lead-
ers in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis. The predominantly reactive
fireman policy of recent years in the Balkans concentrated on managing
crisis after crisis, in Slovenia, Croatia, then Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
now Kosovo. A coherent, long-term policy of conflict prevention that ad-
dresses the looming problems well before they erupt was never designed.
This was most notable in the period of 1995 to 1998 when the interna-
tional community paid its utmost attention to the implementation of the
Dayton peace agreement; at the same time, the Kosovo crisis, as close
observers warned uni sono, was about to erupt, following the exclusion of
3 Speech of the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, at the Conference of the
Foreign Ministers concerning the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Cologne,
10 June 1999, German Foreign Ministry, Mitteilung für die Presse, No. 1041/99, 11
June 1999. See also the speech of OSCE Chairman-In-Office Knut Vollebaek at the
Sarajevo Summit on 30 July 1999, and the presentation of Ambassador Wilfried
Gruber at the Halki International Seminar 1999: A Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe, September 1999 (personal copy of the author).The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
7
the Kosovo issue in Dayton and the radicalisation of the hitherto peaceful
resistance of the Kosovo-Albanians.
4
In addition, the international approach towards the Balkans has indeed
been mainly piecemeal and country-oriented, fatally following the geo-
graphic direction Miloševi￿  chose to take. Thus, the transnational pat-
terns of many problems in the region were hardly tackled: the manifold
border and minority issues, the problem of refugee returns, the region-
wide security concerns and the socio-economic interdependencies, for ex-
ample, in terms of infrastructure.
5 In this regard, the Kosovo conflict has
surely been an eye-opener. It amply demonstrated the inextricably re-
gional nature of the enormous problems shared by the whole region,
drawing Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro into a conflict that could
have escalated even further.
This time, after the end of the war in Kosovo, the governments and inter-
national organisations forming the Stability Pact seem to have drawn the
necessary conclusions, at least in theory. They know that the war is over,
but the victory has yet to be achieved. The international community has
embarked on an integrative, long-term policy that is moving away from
the country-limited focus of the past and, instead, perceives the region as
a whole.
6 At the same time, political leaders have begun to focus on the
sources of conflict, willing to tackle the most divisive issues with a com-
prehensive approach combining all political, economic and military levers
at hand.
4 Richard Caplan: International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo, in: International
Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4, 1998, pp. 745-761.
5 The negotiations on arms control and confidence-building according to Annex 1 B
of the Dayton peace agreement -- the Article II and Article IV agreements already
concluded in 1996, the Article V talks ongoing -- with their region-wide approach
were the exception to the rule.
6 Emil Mintchev points out that such a regional approach guided the Congress of
Berlin in 1878, reaching agreement on borders and multiethnic tolerance; Mintchev:Rafael Biermann
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This is good news. However, there is also a lot of room for scepticism,
derived from past experience and continuing patterns of old thinking. To
pour some water into the wine: It is not that the international community
has gained completely new insights into old realities.
In fact, the EU ‘Regional Approach’, adopted by the European Union on
27 February 1996 as part of the Royaumont process following the Dayton
peace agreement, had already drawn some of the same conclusions after
the three-year war in Bosnia.
7 It envisaged facilitating the successful im-
plementation of the peace plan by supporting the former countries of
Yugoslavia (excluding FRY) and Macedonia politically as well as eco-
nomically with a whole set of EU instruments, including financial assis-
tance under the PHARE and OBNOVA programmes, autonomous trade
preferences, and the offer of Co-operation and Association Agreements.
Thus, the EU concluded Co-operation Agreements with Albania and Ma-
cedonia, extended PHARE and OBNOVA assistance to both countries,
and granted trade preferences to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.
Each improvement in relations was made dependent upon the implemen-
tation of strict conditions set by the European Commission.
8 Compliance
was regularly monitored and reported on an individual basis.
9 According
Friedensordnung nach dem Kosovo-Krieg. Eine integrative Strategie für den Bal-
kan, in: Internationale Politik, Vol. 54, No. 5, May 1999, p. 58.
7 The Royaumont process was initiated at a conference on 13 December 1995, or-
ganised by the European Union, with a declaration of 27 countries to promote sta-
bility and good neighbourhood in South Eastern Europe. For the Regional Ap-
proach, as defined in 1996, see the Council Conclusions of 26 and 27 February
1996 <http//www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/see/docs/reg_approach_96.htm>
8 Council Conclusions on the Application of Conditionality with a view to develop-
ing a Coherent EU-Strategy for the Relations with the Countries in the Region, 29
/30 April 1997
>http/www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/see/docs/conditionality_29_april_97.htm>
9 See the two reports on compliance of the European Commission 15 April 1998 and
26 May 1999
<http//www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/see/com_98_237/index.htm> and
<http//www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/see/com_99_235/6.htm>The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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to the European Commission the expenditure for the countries of the Re-
gional Approach has amounted to more than 7 billion EURO since 1991.
In 1999 alone, more than 700 million EURO were spent.
10
However, these previous international efforts to stabilise the Balkans had
some serious deficiencies. They focused mainly on bilateral relations.
They did not pay enough attention to the Eastern Balkans, thus neglecting
the stabilising potential especially of Bulgaria and Romania for the region
as a whole. The numerous initiatives and aid programs were uncoordi-
nated, running side by side, sometimes even in fierce competition -- as in
the case of the European Royaumont process and the American Southeast
European Co-operative Initiative (SECI). And the main actors lacked the
necessary political will and resolve to make a real difference in the Bal-
kans. Thus, all the Balkan initiatives prior to the Stability Pact are today
mostly perceived as ill-conceived and insufficient.
This time, the odds seem to be better for achieving lasting success. There
is a considerable consensus among the most important international actors
on the main features of the Stability Pact. There is a common under-
standing on both sides of the Atlantic to pull together in one accord.
There has been a merger of all previous efforts by institutions like the
European Union, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the international fi-
nancial institutions and others, including numerous NGOs. And there has
been a serious determination by the international actors, nurtured by a
common feeling of urgency, that far-reaching and long-term decisions
have to be taken to transform the face of the Balkans.
10 The Stabilisation and Association Process for countries of South-Eastern Europe,
Commission Communication to the Council and European Parliament COM (99)
235 - 26 May 1999, chapter 1, p. 2, and chapter 3, p. 5 and Annex 1
<http//www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/see/com_99_235/3.htm>Rafael Biermann
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3. The need for differentiation
At the beginning, there have been many voices in Slovenia, Bulgaria,
Romania, and even Croatia arguing that the Stability Pact is not really the
business of their governments. These countries do not want to be identi-
fied with the negative image of the Balkans any more and view them-
selves as far ahead of the other countries of the region in terms of democ-
ratisation, socio-economic reforms and the rapprochement towards the
Euro-Atlantic institutions. None of these countries wants to be put into
one basket with the countries of the Western Balkans. Indeed, there is
even the fear that the Stability Pact might be understood by some mem-
bers of the European Union as a substitute to EU membership - an under-
standing that was obviously signalled to them from some of the Union
members who are not really interested in giving South Eastern Europe a
real EU perspective.
11
Indeed, at first sight, the Stability Pact appears to benefit primarily the
Western Balkans -- Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, and maybe even Serbia at a later stage. The project is an immediate
response to a specific crisis that erupted in this region, namely in Kosovo.
It is primarily designed to prevent another armed conflict in this part of
the Balkans.
Political ‘stabilisation’ has already taken place in Slovenia, Bulgaria and
hopefully also Romania.
12 In all three countries, there is less focus on sta-
11 These concerns were for example voiced during some meetings the author had in
late September 1999 in the Foreign and Defense Ministry and the National Assem-
bly in Sofia.
12 Present surveys and forecasts in Romania predict that the presidential elections late
next year or early in 2001 might bring former President Iliescu back to power.
European and American politicians currently visiting Bucharest vividly warn that in
this case the accession process of Romania into the Euro-Atlantic institutions might
come to a halt. Romania might lose crucial years of reform, as did Bulgaria in the
time from 1993 to 1996 when society was not ripe for far-reaching, painful reforms.
In Bulgaria, this period of former Communist rule ended with a collapse of theThe Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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bilisation than on integration. Slovenia is only geographically still counted
as a Balkan country and former Yugoslav republic.
13 It has already nego-
tiated on EU membership since March 1998. Bulgaria and Romania like-
wise already have a clear ticket for EU membership, as laid down in their
‘Europe Agreements’. Both have had their multilateral and bilateral
screening with the European Commission since April 1998 as part of their
Accession Partnerships and are actually on the verge of becoming negoti-
ating partners of the EU Commission.
Thus, there is indeed a need to differentiate. However, the Stability Pact
is not solely designed to meet the needs and aspirations of the Western
Balkans. It also holds great potential for the other countries of the region.
The Stability Pact has been intently designed for the whole region. For
one, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania are successful examples of demo-
cratic transformation in South Eastern Europe, as are Greece and Turkey.
These countries demonstrate that captivity to one’s history and region
doesn’t exist. Secondly, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania are the main an-
chors of stability in South Eastern Europe. Spreading democracy, peace
and good neighbourly relations from here to the other parts of the Balkans
means to make the best use of their stabilising potential for Europe as a
whole.
Thirdly, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania have a keen self-interest in
strengthening stability and regional co-operation throughout the region.
All of them are dependent to a high degree on peace, stability and growth
in their neighbourhood. As recent years have amply demonstrated, em-
economy and serious political disruptions that brought the Union of Democratic
Forces back to power.
13 Slovenia has a per capita income per year of $ 9,000, as compared to $ 2,700 in
Romania, $ 2,200 in Bulgaria, and $ 1,400 in Albania (Germany: $ 25,000); see
Michael Dauderstädt: Pulverfaß ohne Boden. Neuordnung und Wiederaufbau im
Kosovo, Politikinformationen Osteuropa, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, No. 81, June
1999, S. 5.Rafael Biermann
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bargoes, a disruption of trade routes, or tremendous refugee flows and
wars had a severe impact on trade, investment and growth in the whole
region.
Fourthly, by actively participating in the Pact, all three countries will pre-
sent themselves to the international community as trustworthy exporters
of stability which deserve to be invited into the Euro-Atlantic community
on their own merits. Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania will gain a lot if
they are perceived as countries taking on responsibility for their region
and Europe as a whole. The Joint Position that was formulated by the
Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania in Sofia on 25 July
1999 following a Bulgarian initiative
14 and presented at the Sarajevo
summit of the Stability Pact on 30 July 1999 signalled that the countries
of the Eastern Balkans are taking up their responsibility as a bridge-head
15
between the Balkans and the rest of Europe.
4. The crucial inception phase of the Stability Pact
To understand the potential of the Stability Pact and also some consider-
able hurdles on the way ahead, it is instructive to take a look at the incep-
tion phase of the Pact -- beginning with the first thoughts in the German
Foreign Ministry in early 1999, and ending with the Sarajevo summit of
29/30 July 1999. It was a phase of remarkable momentum and diplomatic
initiative, but also of severe infighting and struggle about the main fea-
tures of the Pact.
Under the Austrian Presidency in the second half of 1998, there were al-
ready thoughts in some European capitals about the need to devise a com-
14 The Paper, containing concrete proposals for each Working Table, was presented at
the Sarajevo Summit on 30 July 1999 (personal copy of the author). The three
Ministers decided to hold in future regular meetings on the Pact.
15 Emil Mintchev: Das Ziel: Stabiler Brückenkopf in der Balkanregion, Das Parla-
ment, 1 August 1997.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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prehensive strategy for South Eastern Europe. Miloševi￿ ’s military of-
fensive in Kosovo, which started in February 1998 with the crackdown in
the Drenica region, escalated. The Holbrooke-Miloševi￿  agreement of 31
October 1999 had in the last minute averted the NATO air campaign but
had already eroded again. Another war in the Balkans calling for interna-
tional crisis management seemed imminent. Under these circumstances,
the Vienna Summit of the European Union on 11/12 December 1998 de-
cided to formulate a ‘Common Strategy on the Western Balkans’.
16
However, as the ‘Common Strategy’ was one of the new tools designed in
the Amsterdam Treaty to strengthen the Common Foreign and Security
Policy of the EU, the Strategy could not be formulated before the Treaty
entered into force, which took place on 1 May 1999.
In January 1999, the new German government took over the EU Presi-
dency and decided to make the Balkan policy one of its top priorities
during the Presidency. Due to a growing sense of urgency, it was not
deemed possible to wait for the Amsterdam Treaty to enter into force.
Thus, the staff of the Foreign Ministry generated the idea of a Stability
Pact for South Eastern Europe leading to concrete, immediate action.
The initiative had several advantages for the Fischer staff. It fit well into
the overall approach on international security of the new German gov-
ernment as laid down in the coalition treaty, stressing the need to
strengthen conflict prevention in order to avoid further conflict manage-
ment operations. It offered the new government an opportunity to gain
profile and initiative domestically as well as internationally in a popular,
undisputed field. And it allowed the German government in the following
16 For the Vienna document see Europäischer Rat in Wien, Bulletin des Presse- und
Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, No. 7, 17 February 1999, p. 77 (chapter
74). The first ‘Common Strategy’ the European Commission drafted was on Russia,
endorsed at the EU summit in Cologne on 4 June 1999, whereas the Strategy for the
Western Balkans has not been presented yet (September 1999).Rafael Biermann
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six months to set the pace for the Pact, thus giving it a strong impetus
right from the beginning.
4.1. No ‘fast track’ to EU and NATO accession
The first papers for the Stability Pact were already drafted by the Fischer
staff in the early weeks of 1999, long before the air campaign started on
24 March 1999.
17 During a meeting with his State Secretaries and with
the Heads of Department on the Petersberg near Bonn, Joschka Fischer
discussed the Plan at length as part of a tour d’horizon. Two aspects were
striking: Firstly, Joschka Fischer strongly favoured the Plan. From this
point onwards, the German Foreign Minister was seriously committed to
making the Stability Pact a real success.
Secondly, Fischer personally did override serious doubts by some of his
experts. The discussion centred around the sensibility of giving the coun-
tries of the Western Balkans
18 a real EU perspective at this stage. On the
one hand, there were those experts closely following the ongoing acces-
sion negotiations of the European Commission with the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Many of these experts already
saw innumerable hurdles for the countries of the first round to enter the
Community, fearing that a further widening of the group of candidates
would have intolerable consequences for the EU.
19 In addition, a public
diplomacy offensively advocating EU membership for the Western Bal-
kans would raise expectations that simply could not be fulfilled.
17 The following information is based on the personal experience of the author during
his time at the Policy and Advisory Staff of the German Ministry of Defense until
July 1999, supplemented by interviews with experts of the Foreign Ministry.
18 The following only refers to the Western Balkans, as Bulgaria and Romania already
have a clear perspective of EU membership.
19 These objections were also already voiced at that time in the press; see the editorial
by Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger: Der Ruf nach Stabilität, Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung (FAZ), 27 May 1999.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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On the other hand, there were those advocating a sincere EU perspective
for the Western Balkans as the decisive and only incentive for real and
lasting change.
20 Many of them, including the experts on South Eastern
Europe and Fischer himself, were aware of the fact that the Western Bal-
kans was at a decisive cross-roads. They realised the historic dimension
of the decisions to be taken and were, thus, not willing to be bogged
down by the technicalities of enlargement. For them, the Stability Pact
was a strategic decision of high political value for the region and for
Europe as a whole.
In fact, the discussion at the Petersberg was symptomatic of many internal
debates in EU administrations and also inside the European Commission
on this issue in the weeks to come. As it turned out, in Bonn Fischer in-
deed managed to determine the direction of the Stability Pact on this cru-
cial issue. However, in Brussels he was less successful in the discussions
with his European counterparts.
The draft of the Stability Pact was in its first phase, from February to
April 1999, orchestrated on the interministerial German level in the up-
graded ‘Bundessicherheitsrat’. In a second phase, from April to June
1999, it was introduced and finalised on the level of the European Un-
ion.
21
20 President Constantinescu of Romania unambiguously stated in Sarajevo: “Our peo-
ples can, and will unite around such a major and vibrant project as the Stability
Pact. The process of integrating the democratic, European and Euro-Atlantic struc-
tures is the most powerful incentive for unity, mutual respect, and co-operation.”
President Constantinescu’s intervention in Sarajevo on 29 July 1999 (personal copy
of the author). This position is shared by many Western observers; see Ludger
Kühnhardt: Wie der Balkan im Jahr 2010 aussehen könnte, Rheinischer Merkur, 9
April 1999; and Erhard Busek: Helft dem Balkan zur Selbsthilfe, Die Welt, 28 May
1999.
21 For this second phase see also Heinz-Jürgen Axt: Der Stabilitätspakt für Südosteu-
ropa: politischer Aktionismus oder langfristig tragfähiges Konzept? Südosteuropa,
Vol. 48, Nos. 7-8, 1999, pp. 404-415.Rafael Biermann
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The text that Fischer presented at the Council meeting in Luxembourg on
8 April 1999 as the consolidated German proposal contained a far-
reaching message. It demanded a
“clear-cut and repeated declaration (‘Bekenntnis’) of the EU that the
countries of the region have the perspective of membership, even if
that looking from today lies in an unspecified future. This is not only
in order to ensure equal treatment with the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. The perspective of EU membership is, as develop-
ments in the Central and East European countries have demonstrated,
a crucial stimulus for transformation.”
22
Criteria or conditions for entering into negotiations on membership were
not included. This was very straight-forward and corresponded with the
personal convictions of Minister Fischer who obviously wanted to leave
some room for debate in this area. However, the following weeks saw a
gradual watering down of this language due to severe reservations espe-
cially in Paris, the main German ally in European affairs.
The Council meetings on 8 and 26 April 1999 principally welcomed the
German initiative without, however, going into the details, due to the
much more urgent task of finding a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo cri-
sis. Yet, in early May correspondents had already reported from Brussels
that a full perspective of membership was not planned by the European
Commission. It would be a long time before the countries of South East-
ern Europe were prepared for such a step.
23 During the next Council
22 Ein Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, 9 April 1999, <http//www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/6_archiv/inf-kos/hintergr/stabdt.htm>. There seems to be a confusion of
terminology in some publications. The Stability Pact initiative has to be separated
from the so-called ‘Fischer Plan’ that was first presented on 9/10 April 1999 by the
Political Director of the German Foreign Ministry, Wolfgang Ischinger, in Dresden
to his counterparts of the G8, and finally became the basis of the G8 consensus that
opened the gate for the UN Security Council Resolution on 10 June 1999. The
‘Fischer Plan’ focused solely on a solution for Kosovo in six steps in order to get
Russia ‘back into the boat’ and reach a resolution of the UN Security Council. It
was not designed for the whole region.
23 Vorbereitung für einen Stabilitätspakt für den Balkan, FAZ, 14 May 1999.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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meeting on 17 May 1999 in Brussels a ‘Common Position’ by the Euro-
pean Commission was submitted, which was heavily discussed among the
Foreign Ministers. Serious disagreements were leaked, reporting French,
Spain and Dutch objections against offering countries like Albania and
Macedonia a real perspective for accession.
24 The version that was finally
endorsed stated that
“the EU will draw the region closer to the perspective of full integra-
tion of these countries into its structures ... with a perspective of EU
membership on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty once the Copenha-
gen criteria have been met”.
25
This was a clear modification of the Fischer language. For the first time,
full integration of all the countries of South Eastern Europe in the Euro-
pean Union was envisaged. However, the perspective of membership was
now explicitly linked to the strict Copenhagen criteria of 1993 and the
Amsterdam Treaty. There would be no ‘fast track’ to EU membership or
any ‘membership light’.
26 That was a principal and probably unavoidable
decision, reflecting both the realities of South Eastern Europe and the
need to treat all candidates equally. Exempting the countries of the West-
ern Balkans from the conditions set for all other candidates of the en-
largement process would have raised a storm of protest not only in War-
saw, Prague, and Ljubljana, but also among the population of the Union
where an understandable fear of being dragged even more into the Balkan
turmoil has emerged over the years.
24 Rußland bleibt kooperativ. EU-Außenminister beraten Konzept für den Balkan,
Frankfurter Rundschau, 18 May 1999; Europa will dem Balkan helfen, Die Welt, 25
May 1999; Außenminister billigen Balkan-Pakt, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18 May
1999.
25 Common Position concerning the launching of the Stability Pact of the EU on
South-Eastern Europe, 17 May 1999,
<http//www.euuropa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/see/docs/stability_pact_17_may_99.htm>
26 Conclusions of the meeting, 2177th Council meeting, General Affairs, 8016, (Presse
146). See also Wolf J. Bell: Ziel ist die dauerhafte Stabilisierung, General Anzeiger,
20 May 1999.Rafael Biermann
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At the Petersberg meeting of the EU Political Directors on 27 May, the
Stability Pact was finalised. Joschka Fischer now explicitly conceded:
There will be “no short cut into the European structures”. However, he
added, presumably addressing mainly his critics, “if the very idea of
Europe shall unfold its full potential also in South Eastern Europe, the
stabilisation process will need to promise a clear-cut EU accession per-
spective for the countries of former Yugoslavia and Albania, even if the
realisation will only be very long-term.” There are, he stressed, “neither
political, nor economic, cultural, religious or other reasons why the peo-
ple in Dubrovnic, Sarajevo and Belgrade should be denied what the peo-
ple in Dublin, Frankfurt and Warsaw already have, and that is a firm
place in Europe.”
27
The wording that the EU governments finally agreed to in the Stability
Pact on 10 June 1999 was, again, more distanced:
“The EU will draw the region closer to the perspective of full integra-
tion of these countries into its structures. In case of countries which
have not yet concluded association agreements with the EU, this will
be done through a new kind of contractual relationship taking into ac-
count the individual situations of each country with the perspective of
EU membership, on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty and once the
Copenhagen criteria have been met. We note the European Union’s
willingness that, while deciding autonomously, it will consider the
achievement of the objectives of the Stability Pact, in particular prog-
ress in developing regional co-operation, among the important ele-
ments in evaluating the merits of such a perspective.”
It is this final formulation which will be the yardstick for considering EU
membership for any of the countries of South Eastern Europe in the
coming years. The linkage to progress in regional co-operation that is
emphasised throughout the declaration should be noted as should be the
announcement of a “new kind of contractual relationship” of the EU with
27 Speech of the German Minister of Defense, Joschka Fischer, on the Petersberg on
27 May 1999, op. cit.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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the countries of the Western Balkans.
28 Whether this formulation of the
EU that displays more a hands-off policy than clear determination will
suffice to act as the necessary impetus remains to be seen. Having raised
high expectations among the peoples of South Eastern Europe, growing
disillusionment seems to be inevitable as the years go by and the promise
of eventual membership does not materialise.
4.2 The Stabilisation and Association Process -- pure activism or
real substance?
On the EU perspective, the Commission and the Council did not display
very much creativity. The desire to give forceful signals was mainly con-
fined to the realm of rhetoric. However, the Commission obviously saw
some need to go beyond declaratory policy and add more substance to the
EU perspective.
In the ‘Common Position’ that was announced after the Council meeting
on 17 May 1999 the Union offered “a new kind of contractual relation-
ship” for the countries of South Eastern Europe.
29 Thus, the Commission
followed a pattern it had established at two other turning points of recent
history in Europe: in 1989/90 it created the ‘Europe Agreements’ for the
democratisation of countries of Central and Eastern Europe; and in 1991
it designed the concept of ‘Partnership and Co-operation Agreements’ for
the countries of the former Soviet Union.
30
More precisely, on 26 May 1999 the Commission came up with a pro-
posal for starting the so-called ‘Stabilisation and Association Process’.
31 It
28 Both aspects are discussed in more detail in the next chapters.
29 Common Position concerning the launching of the Stability Pact of the EU on
South-Eastern Europe, 17 May 1999, op. cit.
30 An EU expert: “We must think about intermediate steps. It is not comprehensible to
offer only the alternative membership or non-membership”; cited in Europa will
dem Balkan helfen, Die Welt, 25 May 1999.
31 The Stabilisation and Association Process for countries of South-Eastern Europe.
Commission Communication to the Council and European Parliament, COM (99)Rafael Biermann
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was approved by the EU Council meeting in Luxembourg on 21 June
1999. The core of this process is the establishment of the new category of
‘Stabilisation and Association Agreements’ (SAAs) for the countries of
the Western Balkans. It will also include an enhanced political dialogue
on a regional level and deepened economic and trade relations, the devel-
opment and partial re-orientation of financial aid and increased assistance
for democratisation, civil society, education and institution-building.
The actual additional value of this new initiative is yet to be seen. There
is a lot of room for scepticism. Firstly, this new political instrument was
proposed at the Council meeting when the Commission was obviously
trying to ward off more ambitious proposals on EU enlargement to South
Eastern Europe. Secondly, the new contractual perspective does not affect
Bulgaria and Romania, who already signed ‘Europe Agreements’ years
ago and are waiting to be invited to begin accession negotiations. The
SAAs primarily serve those countries that have not concluded Co-
operation Agreements with the EU up to now -- Croatia, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, and even FRY. For Macedonia and Albania the prospect of ne-
gotiating an Association Agreement will simply be replaced by the SAA
perspective.
Thirdly, the Commission stresses that the Regional Approach of 1996 will
remain basically valid. Thus, the conditions for upgrading EU relations
with the individual countries of the Western Balkans and extending finan-
cial aid will not be tempered. Negotiations on the SAAs will start on the
same premises as formulated in the Council Conclusions on conditionality
of April 1997:
 32
235, 26 May 1999, op. cit.; see also the intervention by  Commissioner Van den
Broek at the Sarajevo Summit on 30 July 1999 (copy of the author).
32 Council Conclusions on the Application of Conditionality, 29 /30 April 1997, op.
cit.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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- Rule of law, democracy, compliance with human/minority rights (in-
cluding media)
- Free/fair elections, full implementation results
- Absence of discrimination
- Implementation of the first steps of economic reform (privatisation,
abolition of price controls)
- Proven readiness to adhere to good neighbourly relations
- Dayton compliance (International Tribunal in The Hague, refugee re-
turn, etc.) for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and FRY.
33
The start of negotiations on the SSAs always requires a prior special re-
port by the Commission, in addition to the regular progress reports on all
countries by the Commission. The conditions for concluding negotiations
are even more strict:
- Substantial progress in achieving the objectives of the conditions for the
opening of negotiations.
- Substantial results in the field of political/economic reforms (stable eco-
nomic environment, liberalisation of prices, regulatory framework,
competitive banking sector, etc.).
- Proven co-operation/good neighbourly relations.
In order to give a signal of determination, the Council invited Macedonia
as the first country of South Eastern Europe to begin negotiations on an
SAA. In the eyes of the Commission, Macedonia has made the most sig-
nificant progress in democratisation, economic transformation and good
33 The new stress on greater regional co-operation might place the hurdle for the ap-
plicants even higher. Thus, the Commission indicates that the expanded programme
for South Eastern Europe requires “compliance with more demanding conditions”,
ibid., chapter 3, p. 1.Rafael Biermann
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neighbourly relations during recent years.
34 Albania has been declared to
be the next candidate for opening negotiations on an SAA, with Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina still far from meeting the conditions in the
Commission’s eyes.
As long as the actual content of the SAAs is not known, it is too early to
judge the real value of the ‘Stabilisation and Association process’. Surely,
there are those in the European bureaucracies who are not very interested
in giving the countries of South Eastern Europe a real chance of accession
over time. For them, such an instrument might have just been designed to
buy time until the Kosovo crisis is over. For others, this new instrument
of EU policy towards South Eastern Europe can be used to draw the re-
gion successively closer to membership. In the end, a lot will depend on
the political determination and long-term interest of those political leaders
who pressed for real substance from the beginning.
4.3 The issue of NATO involvement in the Pact
The German draft Fischer originally presented at the Council meeting in
Luxembourg on 8 April 1999 not only contained a far-reaching message
on EU enlargement. It also stated:
“Similarly to EU membership the perspective of NATO membership
is one of the most significant stimuli for transformation. Therefore, it
is of great importance  that NATO retains its policy and keeps the
door open in the long run for new members.”
 35
34 See the Commission Report on the feasibility of negotiating a Stabilisation and As-
sociation Agreement with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Brussels,
16 June 1999, COM (1999) 300. See also Developments in the countries of the Re-
gional Approach since 1996, in particular regarding compliance, since October
1998, with Regional Approach conditionality criteria, added by Country Specific
Conclusions, COM (99) 235, 26 May 1999
<http//www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/see/com_99_235/6.htm>
35 Ein Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, 9 April 1999, <http//www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/6_archiv/inf-kos/hintergr/stabdt.htm>.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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This statement went, as was soon evident, far beyond the interests of most
international actors involved. The EU saw the Stability Pact as an appro-
priate tool for strengthening its nascent Common Foreign and Security
Policy. NATO itself, having just accepted Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic as new members in March 1999, was very careful not to
make any substantial promise or raise any additional expectations on fur-
ther enlargement rounds. Instead, in the ‘Statement on Kosovo’ and in the
final Communiqué of the Washington anniversary summit of 24 April
1999 it decided to postpone any decision on further enlargement until at
least 2002, just confirming its ‘open door’ policy and offering a new
‘Membership Action Plan’ to draw possible candidates closer to NATO.
Thus, the governments of South Eastern Europe which unanimously and
actively supported NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo were pretty much
isolated in their demand to be rewarded for their co-operative behaviour
by being named candidates of NATO enlargement as well, causing some
disappointment especially on the Macedonian side. In the course of the
Kosovo conflict the Alliance, however, spelled out temporary security
guarantees in the case of Macedonia and Montenegro.
In the end, NATO was not willing to go as far as the European Union on
the enlargement issue. It is far too early to offer the countries of the
Western Balkans a perspective of NATO membership. The perspective of
EU enlargement was much more explicitly expressed in the final version
of the Stability Pact than the NATO perspective. The text only reaffirmed
the “right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or
change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance” and the
possibility of “integration, on an individual basis, into Euro-Atlantic
structures.”
36
36 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 10 June 1999, chapter 8.Rafael Biermann
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However, NATO -- and here especially the U.S., not being a member of
the EU -- has a distinct interest in taking on a substantial role in the Sta-
bility Pact. Thus, following a U.S. initiative, NATO announced a new
‘South Eastern Europe Initiative’ (SEEI) and arranged a ‘19+7’ meeting
at the Washington summit, signalling its own interest in a sustained dia-
logue with the region.
37 The Alliance not only strongly endorsed the Sta-
bility Pact in its summit declarations; it also offered to set up a “consulta-
tive forum for security issues”, meaning the 19+7 formula, with the
countries of the region, and it has decided to build on the framework of
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace.
38
The appeal of this body is that NATO has designed a distinct, tailor-made
forum for consultation and co-operation with the countries of South East-
ern Europe, going beyond EAPC and PfP
39, thus strengthening its voice
and gaining stronger leverage in the region.
In future, NATO will have several tools to strengthen security in the re-
gion: the 19+7 meetings; an Ad Hoc Working Group on Regional Coop-
eration in South Eastern Europe where topics like crisis management, de-
fence planning and democratic control of armed forces can be raised; PfP
activities concentrated on assisting in the transformation of the armed
forces; and bi- and multilateral programmes of the NATO countries
which can be co-ordinated in the Alliance. These programmes can make a
real contribution to the re-structuring of the armed forces and to more re-
gional co-operation in security affairs.
37 Vorbeugung, Krisenmanagement, Kriseneindämmung. Die NATO beschreibt ihre
neuen Aufgaben, FAZ, 26 April 1999.
38 The meeting included the Heads of State and Government of Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Slovenia, Communiqué
of the Washington Summit of 24 April 1999, chapter 19.
39 As Bosnia and Croatia are not part of NATO’s PfP programme, the Alliance has, in
fact, opened a new channel for consultation with those two countries that might
have growth potential in future.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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NATO also demanded to play an active role at the ‘Regional Table’ of the
Pact, the main steering body under the Special Coordinator of the EU,
and at the third ‘Working Table’ on security issues. It appeared to be ob-
vious that NATO, being the guarantor and anchor of security and peace in
Bosnia as in Kosovo, would be offered a highly visible, political role in
this Working Table, especially at the Sub-Table on ‘Defence and Security
Issues’. However, due to reservations by some EU governments like
France and also by Russia
40, which took part in the final drafting of the
Stability Pact, the role of NATO was minimised in a way that does not
correspond with its actual significance in the region. The necessity of
gaining Russia’s consent for diplomatically solving the Kosovo crisis and
the French objections against a too-prominent role of NATO in the region
became, in the final analysis, more important than the adequate represen-
tation of the Alliance in the Stability Pact.
41
However, crucial questions are still open to debate. It remains to be seen
whether NATO’s South Eastern Europe Initiative will become merely a
discussion forum, maybe even only a temporary one (the French posi-
tion), or whether the Initiative will gain real substance, starting a practical
co-operation with the seven countries on a bilateral as well as on a re-
gional level (the U.S. position). And it also remains to be seen whether
SEEI will be closely co-ordinated within the Stability Pact or whether the
bypassing of NATO will cause the Alliance to pursue its initiative de
facto separately.
This was the last divisive issue during the inception phase of the Stability
Pact. On 10 June 1999 the Pact was endorsed by a Foreign Ministers con-
ference on exactly the same day that UN Security Council Resolution No.
40 Both argue that the 3. Working Table of the Stability Pact on Security Issues should
be headed and controlled by the OSCE, and that NATO’s SEEI in fact is a duplica-
tion of OSCE efforts in arms control and confidence building.
41 Stabilitätspakt für den Balkan verabschiedet, Neue Züricher Zeitung (NZZ), 11 June
1999.Rafael Biermann
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1244 ended the Kosovo conflict. The EU had waited to sign the Pact until
the Kosovo conflict was over -- a symbol pointing to a better future. The
following months were spent giving the Pact the necessary political
blessing and momentum: The G8 approved the Pact on 20 June 1999, the
German government proposed Bodo Hombach as EU Special Coordinator
on 24 June, and on 30 July the Stability Pact was officially launched at a
summit in Sarajevo that was intended to demonstrate the resolve of the
international community to make this Pact a lasting success.
5. The working of the Stability Pact
42
The philosophy and the procedures of the Stability Pact have a historic
precedent that Joschka Fischer alluded to several times: the Helsinki
Charter of 1975 and the CSCE process, which in the eyes of the German
Foreign Service did a lot to alleviate and then also to overcome the divi-
sion of Europe in 1989.
43 In the early 1970s it was conceived that only a
concept of long-term co-operation with Central and Eastern Europe on a
broad range of topics could bring about the democratic transformation
that the Western countries aimed at for the region. This concept of trans-
formation through an open-ended process of increasing co-operation has
now been applied to the needs of South Eastern Europe. There is a con-
42 It should be noted that, though Kosovo is part of the region covered by the Stability
Pact, both aid programmes are clearly separated. The international community has
set up its own structure to facilitate reconstruction according to the specific needs of
this province, according to UN Security Council Resolution No. 1244. Thus, there
is a UN Coordinator supervising four different branches, all with a distinct lead
agency: one for building up a new civil administration in Kosovo (UN), one for
refugee return (UNHCR), one for strengthening democracy (OSCE) and one for
economic reconstruction (EU). There is, of course, also the international peace force
under NATO command (KFOR). And there is a separate donors process that started
earlier than the donors process for the Stability Pact.
43 See Speech of Joschka Fischer at the Conference of the Foreign Ministers concern-
ing the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Cologne, 10 June 1999, op. cit., p.
2, and his speech at the Petersberg Conference on 27 May 1999, op. cit., p.1.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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siderable openness as to where the Stability Pact will lead. It is designed
as a process that will unfold over time.
The mechanisms of the Pact will also correspond to the mechanisms of
the Helsinki Charter.
44 There is a steering body, the ‘South Eastern
Europe Regional Table’, acting as a clearing house for all questions of
principle.
45 As a rule, this forum will meet on the level of Foreign Min-
isters. Under this Regional Table three ‘baskets’, here called ‘Working
Tables’, were established, concentrating on a whole range of topics: de-
mocratisation and human rights; economic reconstruction, development
and co-operation; and security issues. The Regional  Table and the
Working Tables consist of the participants of the Stability Pact, and might
also include participants and observers from the whole region, from other
interested neighbouring countries and associated countries of the EU, and
from international organisations and institutions. Their objective is to fa-
cilitate the resolution of differences in the region by promoting bi- and
multilateral agreements, identify cross-border projects that strengthen
good neighbourly relations among the countries and inject momentum in
areas where further progress is needed. Each Working Table may estab-
lish sub-tables and establish its own work plan. They will identify the
projects in their realm and decide on the appropriate lead organisations.
46
The Special Coordinator, the former Head of the German Chancellory
under Gerhard Schröder, appointed by the European Union, is the main
representative of the Stability Pact in public. He has a multinationally re-
cruited staff of about 20 members in Brussels. The Special Coordinator
44 See the Annex to the Stability Pact of 10 June 1999: Organisation of the South
Eastern Europe Regional Table and the Working Tables of the Stability Pact for
South Eastern Europe, cit. op. More specified information about the topics of the
Working Tables can be gained there.
45 The Regional Table met for the first time on 16 September 1999 in Brussels.
46 Klaus Grewlich, Task Force South Eastern Europe in the German Foreign Ministry,
at a co-ordination meeting of the ‘Hochschulrektorenkonferenz’ in Bonn on 10
September1999 (personal notes of the author)Rafael Biermann
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chairs the Regional Table, co-ordinates all activities of and among the
Working Tables and reports periodically to the OSCE. He will regularly
meet with the Chairs of the Working Tables.
47 In the future, he will have
to closely co-ordinate his activities with the European Commission which
has accompanied the creation of this new Brussels job with scepticism,
restricting its own competence in the region. It will be seen how the Spe-
cial Coordinator will position himself in the vast Brussels bureaucracy in
terms of infrastructure, finances and political standing. This will have a
major impact on the project as a whole.
Thus, the Stability Pact might become an organism of great productivity
in the coming years. There will be hundreds of meetings of the Regional
Table and the Working Tables with their Sub-Tables, added by numerous
bi- and multilateral meetings in the spirit of the Stability Pact. There will
be meetings on the level of the Heads of State and Government, of the
different Ministers, of administration officials, researchers, and specialists
on the whole range of issues covered by the Pact. A network of contacts
and personal relations will grow among politicians, businessmen, scien-
tists, lawyers, officers etc. from the many countries, international organi-
sations and NGOs involved that will contribute a lot to integrate the re-
gion into the mainstream of European politics.
Dialogue and co-operation will lead to more understanding and removal
of ignorance and misperception. Thus, the Stability Pact entails a chance
for all the countries of the region to make their achievements known and
to impress a new image of the Balkans on the international community.
47 The Chairs of the Working Tables are appointed for two years, the Co-Chairs rotate
on a six-months basis among the countries of South Eastern Europe.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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6. A multitude of hurdles ahead
The Stability Pact is, indeed, ambitious. The overall vision is no less than
the prevention of further conflicts in the region and the profound trans-
formation of South Eastern Europe into a region comprised of demo-
cratic, peaceful, multiethnic civic societies with free enterprise economies
and good-neighbourly relations, settling disputes peacefully according to
international standards. The goal is to help the Balkans catch up and close
the gap that now separates Western and even Central Europe from many
of the countries of Southern Europe, drawing the region into the main-
stream of European politics. As Foreign Minister Fischer proclaimed:
“We must do for South Eastern Europe today what has been done since
1945 for the West and after 1989 for the East of our continent.”
48
6.1 The magnitude of the socio-economic challenge
However, there is hardly room for optimism, given the painful record of
history and the socio-economic challenges that lie ahead. Due mainly to
the years of Communist rule, in socio-economic terms the region is lag-
ging behind Western Europe in the magnitude of several decades. All of
the countries of the region, except for Slovenia, are still far from fulfill-
ing the Copenhagen economic criteria for entering the European Union.
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Roma-
nia and FRY have an added gross national product which does not exceed
the gross national product of Poland or of Hamburg and Bremen.
49 The
countries lack foreign investment, crucial infrastructure, communications,
energy production and transportation. None of the countries has re-gained
the gross national product it earned in 1989. In some of the countries the
economic transformation has hardly begun.
48 Joschka Fischer at the Petersberg Conference on 27 May 1999, op. cit.
49 See Michael Dauderstädt, op. cit., p. 5.Rafael Biermann
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Yet, it must also be acknowledged that the countries of the region suf-
fered more than all other countries in Europe under the expansionist pol-
icy of Miloševi￿  and the necessity of the international community to react
accordingly. Four wars in eight years have eroded most of the confidence
of foreign and domestic investors in the region. The tourist flow to the
region, e.g. to the Dalmatine coast of Croatia or to Northern Greece, has
almost receded in recent years. The war in Bosnia reduced the economic
output of the country down to 10 per cent of pre-war industrial produc-
tion. The trade embargo against FRY from 1993 to 1996 not only termi-
nated all trade between the country and its neighbours; it also stopped all
traffic through this main traditional transit route, dramatically reducing
the exports of countries like Macedonia to Western Europe.
50
The war in Kosovo exacerbated the situation considerably.
51 The destruc-
tion of the most important transit routes, especially of the bridges crossing
the Danube and the railway network, in effect almost decoupled some of
the countries of the region economically from Western Europe. Now the
extremely weak infrastructure throughout the region that was for decades
almost exclusively oriented towards the COMECON and the Soviet mar-
ket has been fully revealed. Those countries like Bulgaria which already
50 In 1993, 33.4 per cent of Macedonian exports went into the European Union. After
the trade embargo against FRY began in 1993, the trade with Western Europe, but
also with countries like Bulgaria, plummeted. Due to the status conflict with Greece
almost all trade routes to Western Europe were closed for Macedonia during these
years. Today the EU share of Macedonian exports has reached 25 per cent again.
The economic loss caused by the trade embargo for Macedonia is supposed to
amount to $ 3,5 billion which amounts to Macedonia’s gross national product of
1998; Sabine Riedel, Michael Kalman: Die Destabilisierung Südosteuropas, op. cit.,
p. 299.
51 See IMF and World Bank: The Economic Consequences of the Kosovo Crisis: A
Preliminary Assessment of External Financing Needs and the Role of the Fund and
the World Bank in the International Response, 16 April 1999; IMF: The Economic
Consequences of the Kosovo Crisis: An Updated Assessment, 25 May 1999; and
Vladimir Gligorov and Nclas Sudström: The Costs of the Kosovo Crisis (The Vi-
enna Institute for International Economic Studies: Current Analyses and Country
Profiles, No. 12), April 1999.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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have a high degree of trade integration with the European Union suffer
the most. The costs of alternative routes of transportation are many times
higher than the usual costs, causing even more industrial plants in South
Eastern Europe to collapse.
6.2 The essential need of full engagement in the Pact
Given this discouraging starting-point for the Stability Pact, the interna-
tional community is well aware of the fact that progress ultimately de-
pends on the earnest will of the countries of South Eastern Europe to
shoulder the primary responsibility for themselves. The Pact is doomed to
fail if there is no sincere and lasting determination among the govern-
ments of the region themselves to co-operate fully in this project, devel-
oping their own initiatives and ideas that lead to concrete agreements. As
Bodo Hombach rightly stated on the first day of the Sarajevo Conference
when the regional leaders were assembled, there needs to be a “get-up-
and-go” spirit in the region itself.
52 And he added:
“The international community will engage in South Eastern Europe in
the same measure as it perceives the unmistakable determination of
each individual State of the region to create the pre-conditions for
further democratisation, for building up civil societies, establishing
favourable conditions for investment and trade, good neighbourly re-
lations and regional co-operation.”
53
This new form of ‘linkage’ policy will drive the whole process in the
coming years. Thus, the founders of the Pact have repeatedly stressed that
the countries of the region are the “owners”
 54 of the stabilisation process.
52 Speech of the Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact, 29 July 1999 (personal copy
of the author). EU Commissioner Van den Broek declared in his intervention in
Sarajevo on 30 July 1999: “The engagement of the states of the region, their owner-
ship of the process, is the cornerstone without which it is meaningless to talk of the
implementation of the Pact” (personal copy of the author). See also Mintchev, op.
cit., p. 61.
53 Ibid.
54 Sarajevo Summit Declaration, 30 July 1999.Rafael Biermann
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The Pact is supposed to represent a “partnership”, as OSCE Chairman-in-
office Knut Vollebaek termed it at the Sarajevo Conference, that crucially
depends on the full commitment of both sides to this undertaking.
55
The call to establish a real partnership, however, not only serves as a se-
rious reminder that aid will only flow to those who earnestly take the ini-
tiative themselves. It also stems from the experience of the Balkan confer-
ences of the 19
th century where the countries of the region were treated as
mere objects of European power politics. Repeating this approach will
make the Pact meaningless if not worse. It should be noted that in the first
months after the Stability Pact was launched, those negative feelings re-
vived again in the region. It will require a lot of sensitivity and empathy
to overcome those emotions which might evoke a fatal ‘wait and see’
policy in the region.
Thus, a lot will depend on whether the promise of real partnership is re-
flected in the day-to-day affairs of the Pact or whether, in practice, the
countries of South Eastern Europe remain de facto objects of the process,
torn between the multiple international actors with their own agendas and
priorities as was so often true in the past. Experience suggests that it will
be difficult to overcome a certain paternalistic behaviour on behalf of the
international community which could in fact inhibit the unfolding of ener-
gies in the region itself.
6.3 Regional co-operation as the key topic of the Pact
However, it remains true that the success of the Stability Pact ultimately
depends on the peoples of South Eastern Europe themselves. And the
“key topic”
56 will be the promotion of good-neighbourly relations and re-
gional co-operation. Hombach called upon the leaders of South Eastern
55 Address by the OSCE Chairman in office, Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek of
Norway, on 30 July 1999 in Sarajevo (personal copy of the author).
56 Ibid.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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Europe to design projects involving two, three or even more of the coun-
tries. And he identified, after a first tour through the region, a “willing-
ness to co-operate regionally not hitherto existing”.
Whether this is too optimistic remains to be seen. To be sure, there are
some positive trends that are inspiring -- the expanding regular dialogue
of the Defence Ministers of South Eastern Europe, co-ordinating their
policies on a wide range of issues; the inauguration of the headquarters of
the Multinational Peace Force in South Eastern Europe as a major, widely
recognised result of this co-operation
57; or the signing of the border treaty
between Croatia and Bosnia at the Sarajevo summit by Franjo Tudjman
and Alija Izetbegovic, a breakthrough in bilateral relations -- this is all
good news for the region. The good examples of Bulgaria and Romania,
which have re-defined the relations with their neighbours, obviously
serves as an incentive for others.
However, all long-term observers of the region know about the poor rec-
ord of intra-regional co-operation in recent decades. Deep-seated mistrust,
nationalist competition and historic bills and myths have hampered co-
operation and contact throughout the region. The intra-regional trade is
marginal. The interest in strengthening transnational infrastructure is lim-
ited. The border crossings are few. Most governments view their neigh-
bours more as competitors and security risks than as partners. All are ea-
ger to increase relations with Western Europe and fear that co-operating
with the neighbours, especially with the less developed ones, might even
minimise their chances to approach the Euro-Atlantic institutions.
To change this century-old pattern of non-co-operation, the countries of
the Stability Pact have devised a system of incentives and deterrents that
57 The Peace Force, composed of ground forces from Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy,
Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey, was inaugurated at Plovdiv on 11 September
1999. It is the first time that the countries of the region have agreed upon regional
co-operation in the field of national security, which has been hitherto guarded as a
purely national domain in South Eastern Europe.Rafael Biermann
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needs to be employed systematically, consistently, and equally to have a
lasting effect. The main incentives are two-fold: progress on the path of
EU accession; and cash flow in the form of grants, investment or trade
preferences. The main deterrents are vice-versa: denial of progress on EU
rapprochement or even termination/suspension of co-operation; and ex-
emption from the cash flow in the region or even sanctions and embar-
goes as in the case of Serbia. These instruments are powerful as the re-
gional leaders know that economic reconstruction and progress ultimately
depend on co-operation with the European Union in the Stability Pact.
As to the incentive of the eventual integration into the European Union,
this depends on consistent language, combining forceful and credible as-
surances of openness with realistic, manageable steps to draw the coun-
tries closer to membership, without evoking unrealistic expectations con-
cerning the time-table. As has been demonstrated, the inception phase of
the Pact was not very promising in this respect.
6.4 The financial commitment of the international community
The issue of money is more delicate and still awaits clear commitments. It
is the second yardstick for measuring whether the international commu-
nity is really serious about the Stability Pact and willing to accept its own
burdens for the sake of the region. And, to be sure, this also includes the
issue of opening the EU market to products from the region, lowering or
even removing EU trade barriers that hamper the exports and thus the
economic growth of the South European states.
58
There are, again, some indicators evoking scepticism. It was surely cor-
rect to stop the initial allusions to a second ‘Marshall Plan’, raising ex-
pectations that cannot be fulfilled. However, there are some factors that
58 President Clinton set a good example in Sarajevo when he announced to lower trade
tariffs on such Balkan exports as shoes; see At Balkan Summit in Sarajevo, Clinton
Takes Aim at Miloševi￿ , International Herald Tribune, 31 July/1 August 1999.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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put in doubt whether the international donors community is really willing
to commit the money necessary to motivate a real new beginning in South
Eastern Europe.
For one, with the reconstruction of Kosovo, the donors community has
just started an enormous aid programme for the same region. All in all,
the first donors conference for Kosovo ended with pledges of more than
100 countries and international organisations totalling $ 2.1 billion.
59 It is
questionable whether almost the same donors at the first donors confer-
ence for the Stability Pact, scheduled for October 1999, will again pledge
a similar amount of money for the same region.
Secondly, it is striking that the donors conference for the Stability Pact
was scheduled after the donors conference for Kosovo. Given the more
urgent need of rapid reconstruction in Kosovo, this was understandable. It
amply demonstrates where the priorities lie at present. However, this
short-term priority should not put into question what is necessary to
change the profile of the whole region in the long run.
Thirdly, the ‘Balkan fatigue’ that has dominated much of the attitude of
the Western community towards the region in past decades is already
emerging again. The further the war in Kosovo moves away on the hori-
zon, the less the readiness to pledge money will be. The Stability Pact
was designed and pushed through before and during the war; it will
hardly receive the same attention by political and financial leaders in
times of peace, as the memories of war fade and the sense of urgency
wanes.
Fourthly, the budget deficits in the main West European capitals will hin-
der those governments from spending considerable amounts of money on
a project of conflict prevention in a far-away region when at the same
time its own population has to endure severe cuts in social welfare. The
59 EU and World Bank Pass Kosovo Hat, International Herald Tribune, 30 July 1999.Rafael Biermann
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German government, for example, decided to cut its budget by 7.4 per
cent in the year 2000 in order to consolidate the federal budget, which
aroused a storm of protest. Under these circumstances it is extremely dif-
ficult to grant greater amounts of money for a project that will yield re-
sults only in the long run.
And fifthly, the dynamic of the inception phase of the Pact was due not
least to the sustained efforts of the German EU Presidency that was eager
to start this programme. Other governments appear to give this project
less priority during their own EU Presidency.
Thus, there has been a striking silence in all meetings of the Stability Pact
on the issue of money during the inception phase. When the topic was
raised, the wording was always rather defensive. U.S. President Clinton
has already stated clearly that the U.S. would play a “more modest role”
in the Pact.
60 EU Commissioner Van den Broek warned at the Sarajevo
Conference: “Those who hope it [the Pact] to act as a conduit for vast
new financial flows into the region will be disappointed.”
61 And Bodo
Hombach cautioned that the Stability Pact is “no horn of plenty”, en-
dowed with unlimited financial means to solve all the problems of the re-
gion.
62
This reserve is nurtured by the discouraging experience of reconstruction
in Bosnia. During the inception phase of the Pact, as part of the interna-
tional attention was drawn back to Bosnia, new criticism emerged on the
international reconstruction programme for this country. Three years after
the programme started, Bosnia is still totally dependent on international
aid, the 15,000 employees in Sarajevo being the main source of growth,
60 Cited in Marshall-Plan für den Balkan, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22 June 1999. See
also “This Time, Europe Pays”, The International Herald Tribune, 14 June 1999.
61 Intervention by Commissioner Van den Broek at the Sarajevo Summit, 30 July
1999 (personal copy of the author)
62 “Serbien muss erst seine politischen Probleme lösen”, interview with Bodo Hom-
bach, Der Spiegel, No. 32, 9 August 1999.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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with a gross national product still only half of that in 1991, with almost
no foreign investment and an unemployment rate of around 40 per cent.
63
The international efforts in Bosnia have generated a “rent seeking econ-
omy”
64 without managing to induce initiative on the part of the Bosnians
themselves. No-one in the EU capitals wants to repeat this frustrating ex-
perience again. And a perpetuation of aid without a time-limit can also
not be the guiding principle for the international community -- neither on
Bosnia, nor on South Eastern Europe as a whole. As one commentator
noted: “Bosnia stands as a model -- of how not to do it.”
65
In addition, there is a widely held belief in Western capitals that money
spent in the Balkans is lost in a bottomless pit. It was a sad coincidence
that just at the time when the Stability Pact was inaugurated a 4,000-page
report by the anti-fraud unit, set up by the Office of the High Representa-
tive for Bosnia, was leaked to the press revealing that as much as one bil-
lion dollars has disappeared from public funds or been stolen from inter-
national aid projects by fraud in Bosnia, a country which has received $
5.1 billion in international aid since 1995.
66 Such allegations, even if offi-
cially denied as over-stated, are a severe blow to the whole project of the
Stability Pact. They will render it even more difficult to raise funds for
the project, inducing the governments and the public to be extremely
critical about spending money on South Eastern Europe. And they will
strengthen those in the EU countries demanding strict controls and ac-
countability for every EURO spent.
67
63 See Sabine Riedl/Michael Kalmann: Die Destabilisierung Südosteuropas durch den
Jugoslawienkrieg, Südosteuropa, Vol. 48, Nos. 5-6, 1999, p. 298;
64 Michael Dauderstädt, op. cit., p. 14.
65 Bosnia, a Botched Recovery From War, International Herald Tribune, 29 July 1999.
66 Bosnia Gets Little Relief. U.S. Team Finds Aid Fraud Sapped $1 Billion, New York
Times, 18 August 1999.
67 Some commentators even campaign for not spending any money for the Stability
Pact due to corruption and mafia structures; Torsten Krauel: Kein Geldregen für den
Balkan, Die Welt, 23 June 1999.Rafael Biermann
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Thus, realism on the part of the Balkan states as to the financial dimen-
sion of the aid is appropriate. This is also true for the German enterprises
that want to get a bigger piece of the cake than in Bosnia where the Ger-
man government has paid 28 per cent of the reconstruction up to now but
German enterprises have got only 6 per cent of the orders.
68 Anyway, in
the final analysis, private investment will be more important than public
investment, and setting the right priorities such as on institution building
will be more important than spending a few EURO more or less.
6.5 The disruptive potential of Serbia
The comments on hurdles and obstacles cannot end without a word on the
disruptive potential of Serbia for the entire region. As long as President
Miloševi￿  stays in power, he will be a permanent source of instability in
the region, threatening other armed conflicts, keeping away investment
and prolonging the image of a region in trouble and turmoil.
The Stability Pact will need a few peaceful and rather stable years in
South Eastern Europe to unfold, and it is not clear whether this ‘window
of opportunity’ will be granted to the region. Three spots of imminent
crisis could very well disrupt the whole fabric of the Stability Pact: Mon-
tenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia. All of them are inextricably linked and
have to be seen in concert.
In Montenegro, since his democratic election in December 1997 President
Djukanovic has embarked on a determined policy of democratic, market
oriented reform, leaning towards and encouraged by the West, threatening
to leave the Yugoslav Federation unless the constitutional relations be-
tween Serbia and Montenegro are re-defined in principle soon. Since the
end of the Kosovo war, this conflict reached another level of escalation,
with Podgorica demanding talks on a re-distribution of power in Yugosla-
68 Wer die Zeche zahlt, Focus, 28 June1999.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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via, threatening an ultimatum a referendum on independence, and
Miloševi￿  declining even to talk about this issue.
 69
In essence, Djukanovic’s policy still aims at a maximum of independence
in the framework of the Yugoslav federation, allowing him to pursue his
Western oriented policy without much interference from Belgrade. This is
also what the majority of Montenegrins still aims at, though the number
favouring complete independence is seeming to rise. Everyone in Monte-
negro knows that Miloševi￿  will hardly tolerate a secessionist move
which would de facto detach another part of FRY from his rule, separate
Serbia from the Adriatic Sea and smash the last remnants of the dream of
‘greater Serbia’.
Up to now, Djukanovic has pursued a moderate, patient policy of seeking
Western and domestic backing, avoiding an open confrontation with
Miloševi￿ , however taking all the measures necessary to prepare domes-
tically for independence
70. He is still willing to give the democratic oppo-
sition in Serbia a chance to oust Miloševi￿  which would open new pros-
pects for the democratisation of Serbia and thus also for Montenegro’s
remaining in FRY.
69 In August 1999, Podgorica tabled concrete proposals on the distribution of powers
in FRY, demanding equal representation in all federal bodies (including a new par-
liament), de facto independence in economic affairs, its own Foreign and Defence
Ministry, and a right of veto in all other decisions of the federal bodies. The com-
mand over the federal armed forces would rotate among the two republics of the
new confederation. Djukanovic threatened to hold a referendum on full independ-
ence in six weeks if Miloševi￿  would decline; see Montenegro strebt nach
Selbständigkeit, NZZ, 6 August 1999; Belgrad ignoriert Montenegros Streben nach
mehr Selbständigkeit, FAZ, 7 August 1999.
70 Djukanovic is already preparing for an independent Montenegrin currency, replac-
ing the Yugoslav Dinar. He has employed the well-known Steve Hanke who has
successfully installed a Currency Board in Bulgaria 1997 which tied the Bulgarian
Lew to the German Mark. Djukanovic seems to favor a similar path for his republic.
Thus, Montenegro might follow the model of Slovenia where the introduction of a
new currency in 1991 was the first step to independence; see Montenegros Sezes-
sionisten im Aufwind, NZZ, 31 August 1999.Rafael Biermann
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However, time is running out to find a peaceful solution. Impatience has
been growing in Podgorica since Montenegro is not willing to be captive
any longer to Miloševi￿ ’s disastrous policy.
71 If Djukanovic’s strategy of
restraint does not materialise, he might very well openly opt for leaving
the Yugoslav federation and declaring independence.
72 This would con-
front the Western countries with an extremely delicate choice: The inter-
national community can and will probably not accept any move of Monte-
negro towards independence which would open a Pandora’s box in terms
of re-drawing borders all over the Balkans. This was pointed out several
times by the main Western powers. However, the price might be to aban-
don Djukanovic who is the most prominent and powerful figure of hope
for democratic change in FRY and who is striving for the same values the
Western community stands for.
The future of Kosovo, the second major risk of the Stability Pact, will set
a precedent for the whole region. At present, the international community
appears to be determined to stick to what has become the bottom line of
its Kosovo policy since the elimination of autonomy in Kosovo in March
1989: the sovereignty and territorial integrity of FRY and, thus, the call
for a substantial autonomy for Kosovo within FRY. This was once again
explicitly stated in UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999,
and it was the conditio sine qua non for FRY, Russia and China accepting
NATO’s peace force in Kosovo.
71 The sense of urgency is increased by the rapidly escalating economic malaise in
FRY, following the Kosovo war and the strict sanctions enacted by the international
community against the Miloševi￿  regime. The sharp increase in inflation and the de-
valuation of the Dinar, due to Belgrade’s policy of printing new money excessively
to pay for salaries and pensions, severely hamper the Montenegrin economy, with-
out Podgorica having any political influence on the financial decisions taken in Bel-
grade.
72 Djukanovic asked about becoming a member in the Council of Europe and in the
OSCE; Montenegro möchte in OSZE und Europarat; FAZ, 16 September 1999.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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However, as time passes by, the chances of Kosovo remaining in FRY
are becoming more and more dim. The first few months in Kosovo the
UN civil administration and NATO have, due to substantial pressure by
the KLA and a need to avoid an open confrontation with this new force in
Kosovo, taken measures which in fact increase the likelihood of Kosovo’s
becoming independent.
The decision to create a Kosovo Corps, manned by former KLA fighters,
in fact allows the KLA to keep a force, albeit mainly unarmed, which is
in the eyes of the Albanian Kosovars the nucleus for a future regular army
for Kosovo. The outer borders of Kosovo are controlled by NATO, not
by Serbian border guards. And NATO will hardly dare to allow Serbian
personnel to return to Kosovo for the time being, though UN Security
Council Resolution 1244 explicitly permits Serbian personnel to maintain
a presence at key border crossings and at Serb patrimonial sites.
Moreover, the Yugoslav Dinar has already been replaced by the German
Mark. Taxes are paid to UNMIK in Pristina, not to Belgrade.
73 The elec-
tions that will take place in the coming years will elevate political leaders
to power who unanimously and strongly favour independence. There will
be some seats reserved for minorities in parliament and administration;
however, either these seats will remain vacant, or they will be more of a
front, not able to alter the path of Kosovo anyway.
Thus, Kosovo will gain step by step many of the features of an independ-
ent state. This completely corresponds with the wishes of almost all peo-
ple in Kosovo, since ‘ethnic purity’ has in fact largely been achieved by
the expulsion of Serbs and Roma in the aftermath of the Kosovo war.
Serbia has effectively lost control over Kosovo, and it is hard to imagine
KFOR leaving the region and Serbian forces re-entering it at any time in
the foreseeable future.
73 See the excellent article by Matthias Rüb: Unterschiedliche Vorstellungen über die
Zukunft des Kosovo, FAZ, 20 September 1999.Rafael Biermann
42
Thus, reality and paper, factual development and official wording are
drifting apart, and this gap will continuously deepen. At some point of
time, when the Western governments become more and more disgruntled
about the prospect of having their armed forces for an indefinite time-span
in Kosovo, the international community will face tough choices: either to
hand Kosovo back to Serbia, which would probably stimulate another
round of war in Kosovo, as the KLA would never accept such a move; or
to accept Kosovo’s independence, which would imply not only a historic
reversal of Western principles on Kosovo policy but also risking a major
disruption of relations with Serbia, Russia and China.
For now, the international community can buy time to let reconciliation
take hold. However, there is currently no conceivable scenario that might
offer a peaceful solution to the Kosovo issue. The only, though vague
hope is that a Serbia which has turned democratic would be willing to ac-
cept Kosovo’s independence in the long run. However, up to now this
hope seems to be rather idealistic as today’s democratic leaders in Serbia
hardly think about Kosovo differently from Miloševi￿ .
There is another aspect of this complex picture, and this brings in the fu-
ture of Macedonia. Many people in the region fear a re-opening of the
‘Albanian question’ after just having gained control over the ‘Serbian
question’. The perception of most actors in the region is that Kosovo will
finally gain independence. This is the scenario the neighbouring countries
are preparing for. And this is the scenario which is most frightening for
Macedonia which has a minority of about 30 per cent Albanians on its
territory.
74
74 This was evident at an international conference in Varna on ‘Security and Re-
construction in South Eastern Europe’, which the author attended on 24 to 26 Sep-
tember 1999. Emil Mintchev called such a development a “nightmare“ for the
whole region; presentation at the Center for European Integration Studies in Bonn
on 14 September 1999 (personal notes of the author).The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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An independent Kosovo will immediately put into question the future of
the statehood of Albania and Macedonia. Up to now, the KLA and the
other political parties in Kosovo have been cautious of talking about the
prospect of a ‘Greater Albania’. In the coming years, they will primarily
focus on re-construction, democratisation and independence. However, in
the longer run a merger of an independent Kosovo with Albania and the
Northern part of Macedonia has a considerable likelihood. It has already
been propagated by important political forces in Albania.
75 However, it
would be a nightmare for the entire region, opening a new vicious circle
of nationalist fervour, redrawing of borders and armed conflict.
76 For the
still fragile young country of Macedonia, whose very existence was put
into doubt for several years, such a prospect is already raising tensions
domestically.
Thus, the prospects of ‘Greater Albania’ and, indeed, the future of the
region as a whole will be very much determined by the future of Kosovo.
And the future of Kosovo will be influenced by the future of Serbia. The
successful democratisation of Serbia is the key for avoiding another round
of conflict on the Balkans.
77 This transformation of Serbia is no guarantee
for lasting peace in South Eastern Europe; yet, it is the only real chance
75 The former Albanian President Berisha, now the main opposition figure in his
country, has openly proposed an Albania federation on a party congress, even al-
luding to the Albanian minorities not only in Macedonia, but also in Montenegro
and Greece; Berisha for albanische Föderation, FAZ, 2 October1999.
76 In a very fundamental speech on American Balkan politics Deputy Secretary of
State Strobe Talbott declared, the U.S. would not accept an independent Kosovo;
and he proceeded: “Quite to the contrary, we feel that secession would give heart to
separatists and irredentists of every stripe elsewhere in the region. Most of all, se-
cession would encourage proponents of Greater Albania – a single state stretching
across the Balkan peninsula from Albania proper to northwestern Macedonia, with
its own sizeable ethnic Albanian population. Greater Albania would be no less
anathema to regional peace and stability than Greater Serbia.“ Address at the Aspen
Institute, Aspen, Colorado, 24 August 1999.
77 Once again Strobe Talbott in his Aspen address: “If the people who live there [in
Kosovo] are ever going to settle for some form of self-governing autonomy short of
total independence, it will only be if Serbia itself changes profoundly.“Rafael Biermann
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to keep Kosovo within FRY and, thus, to prevent the redrawing of bor-
ders in the entire region. This is what makes the democratisation of Ser-
bia so pivotal. It is an issue that is, indeed, urgent as the time factor is an
important factor in the whole equation.
8. Conclusion and Perspectives
Thus, the Stability Pact is facing serious, perhaps almost insurmountable
risks and hurdles. The first few months were very promising. The shock
of the Kosovo crisis really seemed to unite all the main international ac-
tors. The determination to make the Pact a real success was remarkable.
However, since the end of the German EU Presidency the momentum of
the whole process has significantly slowed down. Nine months after the
concept of the Stability Pact was first designed in the German Foreign
Ministry, people have become more cautious and realistic in words and
deeds. Since the glamorous inauguration ceremonies in Cologne and
Sarajevo, now it is time to look for the substance of the Pact.
It is obvious and almost inevitable that the European bureaucracy has be-
gun to take hold of the project, and there is a real danger that the Pact
will be bogged down in intra- and inter-organisational rivalries and com-
petition. At the same time, a certain ‘wait-and-see’ attitude in many gov-
ernments of the region seems to take hold, often neglecting the primary
responsibility these countries bear themselves. Impatience and disillu-
sionment in South Eastern Europe is growing rapidly
78, as people are ea-
78 This was clearly expressed by almost all participants of the above mentioned con-
ference in Varna the author attended in September. It was the first question the
author was asked by a Bulgarian radio station during his stay. And it was openly
addressed by the officials from the Bulgarian National Assembly, the Foreign and
the Defence Ministry and from the think-tanks the author met right after the confer-
ence in Sofia.The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
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gerly waiting for concrete signs of commitment by the international com-
munity.
However, it is important to keep in mind that the Stability Pact is not in-
tended for months, but for many years to come, maybe for decades. To
grasp the magnitude of the challenge ahead, it is wise to bear in mind that
the Balkans -- except for Croatia, Slovenia and parts of Romaina -- were
separated for many centuries from West European culture and politics.
Six hundred years of Osmanic rule left a distinct mark on the mentality
and political structures of the region. The countries of South Eastern
Europe did not experience what had a deep and lasting impact on the
mental and political development of Western and Central Europe: espe-
cially the centuries of renaissance, humanism and enlightenment, which
promoted the ideas of individualism, rationality, human rights, and West-
ern constitutional thinking.
Thus, the Pact surely is no deus ex machina, instantly solving all the
problems that have plagued the region for centuries. Its design is long-
term, and to have an effect all participants will need patience, resolve and
persistence. Setbacks will surely come -- in the form of political turmoil,
economic recession, social unrest or even military conflict.
At this point of time it is paramount to get the Pact really going. What is
now needed is an indication of continuing resolve, consisting of three
elements: Firstly, a clear signal by the countries of the region themselves
to go ahead, take the chance and act in a new spirit of co-operation and
reconciliation. Secondly, an equally clear financial signal of commitment
by the donors conference, clarifying that the international community has
really grasped the magnitude of the challenge ahead. And thirdly, a signal
of determination by the European Union that the countries of South East-
ern Europe have, indeed, a credible perspective for membership.
The invitation the EU Commission recommended to begin accession ne-
gotiations with Bulgaria and Romania at the Helsinki summit of the Euro-Rafael Biermann
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pean Union in December 1999 will be such a signal. It demonstrates that
not only the countries of Central Europe but also the countries of South
Eastern Europe that make unmistakable progress in terms of democratisa-
tion, good neighbourly relations and multi-ethnic tolerance have a real
chance to escape the claws of history. The emerging European peace or-
der will only be a lasting and stable one if all the peoples of Europe can
eventually be drawn into the mainstream of European politics.ISSN 1435-3288 ISBN 3-933307-56-2
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